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INTRODUCTION

The quality and quantity of public services provided by all
levels of government have come under severe attack in recent
years. Fiscally burdened state and local governments have been
hard pressed to meet demands for more and better services. Recent activities on the part of some state legislatures and courts
seeking to remedy inadequacies in public services appear to have
diminished or eliminated contractual rights of the holders of bonds
issued by governmental bodies to raise funds for a variety of capital
improvements.
In New Jersey and many other jurisdictions, funds for providing public education at the elementary and secondary levels have
been raised primarily by the impositon of a local real property tax.1
In Robinson v. Cahill,2 the New Jersey supreme court struck down
the present method of financing education within New Jersey's 600
school districts. 3 The court found that the state's constitutional
requirement of a "thorough and efficient" free public education
was not being satisfied. 4 The supreme court ordered the state
* A.B., Georgetown University; LL.B., Yale Law School; Member, New Jersey & New
York Bars.
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Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super. 223, 229, 287 A.2d 187, 190, supplemented, 119
N.J. Super. 40, 289 A.2d 569 (L. Div. 1972), affd as modied, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273,
supplemented, 63 N.J. 196, 306 A.2d 65, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973). State and federal
assistance has supplemented the local property tax in such areas as transportation, lunch
programs, and new building construction. 118 N.J. Super. at 229, 287 A.2d at 190. When
Robinson was commenced in 1970, the amended State School Aid Law of 1954 was in effect.
The provisions of this law comprised a "foundation program" consisting of a minimum base
dollar figure supplemented by "formula aid," an equalization aid formula which was computed utilizing a complicated mathematical equation. See id. For the text of the amended
State School Aid Law see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:58-1 et seq. (Supp. 1974-75).
2 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973), affg as modified 119 N.J. Super. 40, 289 A.2d 569,
supplementing 118 N.J. Super. 223, 287 A.2d 187 (L. Div. 1972), supplemented, 63 N.J. 196,
306 A.2d 65, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973).
1 118 N.J. Super. at 232, 287 A.2d at 192.
4 62 N.J. at 515, 303 A.2d at 295. See N.J. CONST. art. 8, § 4,
1. The court's
determination that an education of "thorough and efficient" quality was not being provided
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legislature to develop a method of financing the cost of education
which meets the constitutional mandate within a period of two
5
years .
A number of new methods for financing the cost of education
have been considered, including a plan by which the state would
absorb all costs. 6 This program, or a similar proposal, could result
in the reduction or elimination of the power of local school districts
to impose real property taxes to raise money for school purposes.
Since outstanding school bonds are secured by a pledge to impose
real property taxes, such action could markedly affect the contract
between existing bondholders and school districts.
Recently, the states of New York and New Jersey repealed a
statutory pledge-commonly referred to as the 1962 covenant
-between the two states and "affected" bondholders of the Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey. 7 This covenant was intended to insure the continued high credit rating of the Port
Authority by assuring bondholders that it would limit its involvement in fiscally perilous deficit rail operations.8 The repeal of the
was based on the dollar input per pupil. 62 N.J. at 515-16, 303 A.2d at 295. The validity of
the cost-quality relationship in education has been challenged by several commentators. See,
e.g., Carrington, On EgalitarianOverzeal: A Polemic Against the Local School Property Tax Cases,
1972 U. ILL. L.F. 232, 239-41; Schoettle, The Equal Protection Clause in Public Education, 71
COLUM. L. REV. 1355, 1378-81 (1971).

5 In its supplemental opinion, the supreme court stated that it would
not disturb the statutory scheme unless the Legislature fails to enact, by December
31, 1974, legislation compatible with our decision in this case and effective no later
than July 1, 1975.
63 N.J. at 198, 306 A.2d at 66. The court declined to consider future judicial remedies, if
any, should the legislature fail in its task. Id.
For an extensive analysis of the Robinson decision see Tractenberg, Reforming School
Finance Through State Constitutions: Robinson v. Cahill Points the Way, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 365
(1974). See also Ruvoldt, Educational Financing in New Jersey: Robinson v. Cahill and Beyond, 5
SETON HALL L. REV. 1 (1973).
n N.J. Assembly Bill No. 1644 (introduced May 6, 1974). For some of the other tax
proposals considered in response to the Robinson decision see note 102 infra. See also NEW
JERSEY TAX POLICY COMM., REPORT, Part III, Service Levels and State Aids 43-49 (Feb. 23,
1972). This study, completed prior to the supreme court's decision in Robinson, recommended "[t]hat the State assume responsibility for all of the operating costs of a standard
quality education." Id. at 44.
1 Law of April 30, 1974, ch. 25, 1 N.J. SEss. LAw SERv. 34 (1974), repealing Law of Dec.
28, 1972, ch. 208, § 6, [1972] N.J. Laws 801 (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 32:1-35.55a
(Supp. 1974-75)) (amendment applicable to prospective buyers not holders of bonds issued
between 1962 and 1972), amending Law of Feb. 13, 1962, ch. 8, § 6, [1962] N.J. Laws 47
(codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 32:1-35.55 (1963)). Law of June 15, 1974, ch. 993, 9 N.Y. SEss.
LAw NEWS 1590 (1974), repealing Law of May 10, 1973, ch. 318, § 2, [1973] N.Y. Laws
448-49 (codified at N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS § 6606 (McKinney Supp. 1973-74)), amending Law
of March 27, 1962, ch. 209, § 6, [1962] N.Y. Laws 412-27 (codified at N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS
§ 6606 (McKinney 1961)).
1 See notes 138-39 infra and accompanying text.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6: 48

1962 covenant, resulting from pressures to develop improved mass
transportation systems, affects the future financial strength of the
Port Authority and, thus, its ability to meet its obligations on the
outstanding bonds held by investors.
Bondholders may also be affected by other developments in
New Jersey. In one instance, a portion of one municipality has
successfully severed itself from that entity and annexed itself to
another.9 Additionally, two bills have been introduced which would
allow a local school system to withdraw from a regional district.1 0
These actions could affect bondholders, since both school and
municipal bonds are payable from local ad valorem property taxes.
Since severing part of a municipality or school district reduces the
property tax base of the original district or municipality by the
severed area's share of the ratables, a bondholder might feel that
the source of funds for the repayment of his bonds is thereby
diminished.
These recent developments in New Jersey could have a
significant impact on the future security and viability of bonds
issued by the state and its political subdivisions. The possible dilution of bondholders' rights requires testing under the constitutional prohibition of impairment of contract. An examination of
these developments reveals that, while most may be navigated
successfully through the constitutional channel, some will run
aground.
IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACTS

In placing restrictions on state power, the Framers of the
Constitution provided that "[n]o State shall . . . pass any . . . Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts."'" Chief Justice Taft, in

I See West Point Island Civic Ass'n v. Township Comm., 54 N.J. 339, 255 A.2d 237
(1969). See also note 197 infra.
10 N.J. Assembly Bills Nos. 824 & 825 (introduced Jan. 24, 1974).
1' U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. This restriction has been interpreted as being applicable only
to state action, and as not binding the actions of federal administrative agencies or acts of
Congress arising under any powers specifically granted by the Constitution. See, e.g., Continental I11.Nat'l Bank v. Chicago R.I. & P. Ry., 294 U.S. 648, 680 (1935); Century Arms, Inc.
v. Kennedy, 323 F. Supp. 1002, 1014-15 (D. Vt.), affd mem., 449 F.2d 1306 (2d Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1065 (1972). While the contract clause is not applicable to actions of the
federal government, the due process clause of the fifth amendment acts as a limitation on
the power of the federal government to impair contracts. Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8
Wall.) 603, 623-24 (1869); Century Arms, Inc. v. Kennedy, 323 F. Supp. at 1014-15.
That the contracts clause is applicable to state legislative action and that no comparable
provision operates as a restraint on the legislative powers of Congress, is evidenced by the
exclusive power of Congress "[t]o establish.., uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies
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Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan,12 citing "a long line of decisions," stated
that the impairment of contract clause "is directed only against
impairment by legislation and not by judgment of courts."'1 3 Prior
to Tidal Oil, the courts had followed two distinct lines of thought in
handling challenges on the issue of impairment of contracts. In
Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque,1 4 the Court had held that a valid contract
could not be impaired by any subsequent state court decision which
altered the construction of the law existing at the time of the
making of the contract. 15 The other approach, taken in Commercial
throughout the United States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. Thus, Congress may discharge
bankrupts from pre-existing debts, thereby impairing contract obligations. However, the
exercise of this power must be reasonable and is governed by the "just compensation" clause
of the fifth amendment. In Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555
(1935), the Supreme Court held that subsection (s) added to section 75 of the federal
Bankruptcy Act by the Frazier-Lemke Act, Act of June 28, 1934, ch. 869, 48 Stat. 1289, was
in violation of the fifth amendment. 295 U.S. at 601-02. The amended Act allowed certain
defaulting mortgagors to retain their property thus depriving the mortgagees of the remedy
of foreclosure for several years. Although the legislation was proposed to meet the economic
plight of the depression, as was the contested statute in Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v.
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934), Justice Brandeis distinguished Blaisdell, where the legislation
was contingent upon the continuation of the emergency, while, by its terms, the FrazierLemke Act would allow mortgagors to retain possession and continue in default for several
years after the termination of the emergency. 295 U.S. at 597-98.
Holding that the Act had taken from the mortgagees their rights in specific property,
Justice Brandeis stated:
[T]he Fifth Amendment commands that, however great the Nation's need, private
property shall not be thus taken even for a wholly public use without just compensation. If the public interest requires, and permits, the taking of property of
individual mortgagees in order to relieve the necessities of individual mortgagors,
resort must be had to proceedings by eminent domain; so that, through taxation,
the burden of the relief afforded in the public interest may be borne by the public.
Id. at 602.
Congress amended the Frazier-Lemke Act in accordance with the Court's opinion. Act
of Aug. 28, 1935, ch. 792, 49 Stat. 942. The amended Act was subsequently upheld in
Wright v. Vinton Branch of the Mountain Trust Bank, 300 U.S. 440 (1937).
One commentator, in discussing the relationship of fifth amendment due process
limitations on the right of the federal government to impair contracts, has stated:
Although there is no clause expressly forbidding the federal government to pass
laws impairing the obligation of contracts, any federal law impairing them in a
manner which the Supreme Court deemed unreasonable would doubtless be held
to be a deprivation of property without due process, contrary to the Fifth Amendment.
Hale, The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause, 57 HARV. L. REv. 852, 890 (1944).
12 263 U.S. 444 (1924).
13 Id. at 451. The Chief Justice further stated that the very language of the contract
clause "plainly requires such a conclusion." Id.
14 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175 (1863).
"5Id. at 206. The Court relied on the rule as it was articulated by Chief Justice Taney in
a separate concurring opinion in Ohio Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Debolt, 57 U.S. (16 How.)
416 (1853). 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) at 206.
Chief Justice Taney had stated:
And the sound and true rule is, that if the contract when made was valid by the laws
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Bank of Cincinnati v. Buckingham's Executors, 16 more nearly reflects
the position of Chief Justice Taft that the contract clause applies
only to state legislative action and not to state judicial
determinations. 17 In Tidal Oil, Chief Justice Taft reconciled these
two approaches to the issue of impairment, indicating that Gelpcke
and its progeny had not been brought under the contract clause.
Instead, he observed, those cases had been decided under article
III, which enabled federal courts in diversity of citizenship actions
to base their decisions "on the state law as they determined it." 8 If
the Gelpcke rationale was eroded by Tidal Oil, it was entirely washed
away by Justice Brandeis in Erie RailroadCo. v. Tompkins.t 9 The Erie
doctrine mandates that federal courts in diversity actions are no
longer "free to exercise an independent judgment as to what the
common law of the State is;" '20 rather, the courts must "apply as

their rules of decision the law of the State, unwritten as well as
written."'2' As a result, in a Gelpcke situation, where a state court has
judicially determined that a contract is not valid, the combined
effect of Tidal Oil and Erie would preclude the federal courts from
disregarding the state case law and finding an offensive impairment. Thus, in order for the courts to find an unconstitutional
impairment of contract, there must be some state legislative action.
The "Obligations of Contract"
"Obligations of Contract" were recognized as early as 1810,
when Chief Justice Marshall, in Fletcher v. Peck, 2 2 noted that a state,
of the State, as then expounded by all the departments of its government, and
administered in its courts of justice, its validity and obligation cannot be impaired
by any subsequent act of legislature of the State, or decision of its courts, altering
the construction of the law.
57 U.S. (16 How.) at 432.
It should be noted that this point of view was not adopted-by the majority of the Court
at this time. However, within nine years of the Ohio Life decision and pri~r to Gelpcke, the
Court held that the construction given a state statute by the state's highest court is to be
considered part of the statute and is therefore binding on the Supreme Court. Leffingwell v.
Warren, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 599, 603 (1862).
16 46 U.S. (5 How.) 317 (1846).
17 Id. at 342-43.

" 263 U.S. at 451-52. This policy followed the doctrine established in Swift v. Tyson, 41
U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), which interpreted the Judiciary Act of 1789 as giving federal courts
the power to decide questions of general common law even if their decision reverses or
overrules a determination of the state court. Id. at 18-19.
19 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
20 Id. at 71.

21 Id. at 73. Accordingly, the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), was
expressly overruled. 304 U.S. at 79.
22 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
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as a party to a contract, was bound by the tenets of the contract
clause.2 3 This phrase was further interpreted in Ogden v.
Saunders,2 4 as "the law which binds the parties to perform their
agreement. ' 25 The "obligations" include more than just the express
covenants found on the face of the contract. In the often cited Von
Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 26 the Court discussed whether other

obligations were imposed on the parties to a bond contract:
[T]he laws which subsist at the time and place of the making of a
contract, and where it is to be performed, enter into and form a
part of it, as if they were expressly referred to or incorporated in
its terms. This principle embraces alike those which
affect its
27
validity, construction, discharge, and enforcement.
An essential element of a contractual obligation is a remedy
for enforcement in the event of a breach by one of the parties. 28 In
the absence of a remedy which is sanctioned and enforced by the
law, contracts would be little more than "gentlemen's agreements."
Without impairing the obligation, however, the remedy to enforce
that obligation may be modified-so long as the particular remedy
is not a substantial contractual right.2 9 For example, a state may
abolish debtor's prison; 30 change procedural methods for the enforcement of contracts; 3 ' and extend periods of redemption. 32 The
test applied to a modification of remedy is that of reasonableness,
necessitating the deciding of each case "upon its own cir23

24
25
26
27

Id.
25
Id.
71
Id.

at 137-38.
U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827).
at 257 (citing Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 197 (1819)).
U.S. (4 Wall.) 535 (1866).
at 550. New Jersey law provides that when a school district issues bonds, those

bonds
shall be a lien upon the real estate situate in the district, the personal estates of the
inhabitants of the district and the property of the district, and such estates and
property shall be liable for the payment thereof.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:24-56 (1968). Accord, id. § 18A:13-26 (pertaining to regional school
districts).
2" 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 554.
29 Id. at 553-54.
30 Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 200-01 (1819), wherein Chief
Justice Marshall stated:
Confinement of the debtor may be a punishment for not performing his contract,
or may be allowed as a means of inducing him to perform it. But the State may
refuse to inflict this punishment, or may withhold this means, and leave the contract
in full force. Imprisonment is no part of the contract, and simply to release the
prisoner does not impair its obligation.
31 Pennsylvania Co. for Ins. of Lives v. Marcus, 89 N.J.L. 633, 638, 99 A. 405, 407 (Ct.
Err. & App. 1916); Klorman v. Westcliff Co., 12 N.J. Misc. 266, 271, 170 A. 251, 253 (Sup.
Ct. 1934); see Antoni v. Greenhow, 107 U.S. 769, 782 (1882).
32 Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 447 (1934).
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cumstances. ''3 3 In deciding whether there has been a legislative

impairment, a court will consider whether the remedy sought to be
modified was one central to the contract, and therefore one of the
primary reasons for either party entering into the contract.3 4 When
a legislature arbitrarily attempts to reduce the effectiveness of
essential remedies, the courts will conclude that there has been an
unconstitutional impairment of the contract.
Police Power-The Reserved Power of the State
to Validly Impair Contracts
While state legislatures are constitutionally prohibited from
impairing contracts, they are also charged with the responsibility of
providing for the health, safety, and general welfare of their
citizenry. Where the state legislature has been confronted with a
fiscal emergency and has chosen a potential solution which has the
effect of impairing contractual obligations, how will the courts
respond to this exercise of reserved "police power"?
Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell 5 represents one
judicial reaction to this dilemma. In 1933 during a duly declared
economic emergency, the Minnesota legislature passed a statute
which provided that, when a mortgagee sought relief by way of a
foreclosure proceeding and execution sales, the "sales may be
postponed and periods of redemption may be extended.

' 36

The

effectiveness of the act was limited to " 'the continuance of the
emergency and in no event [was to extend] beyond May 1,
1935.' "3 The enactment was challenged as being an unconstitutional impairment of the obligation of contracts. 3 s The Supreme
Court, in rejecting this contention, explained that "[t]he economic
interests of the State may justify the exercise of its continuing and
dominant protective power notwithstanding interference with
3 9

contracts."

Recognizing that reserved state power had been previously
invoked to provide temporary relief from the enforcement of contracts when the public safety was affected by physical causes "such
as fire, flood or earthquake," the Court held that this power may
a Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 553-54.
See City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 514 (1965).
35 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
36 Id. at 416.

37 Id. (quoting Act of April 18, 1933, ch. 339, § 8, [1933] Minn. Laws 522).
38 290 U.S. at 404. The statute was also challenged as a deprivation of property without
due process. Id.
39 Id. at 437.
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also properly be exercised when relief is demanded from an
economic disaster.4" Thus, the Court upheld the statute primarily
because of the act's temporary nature, and its being a valid legislative reponse to the emergent economic situation.4 '
Also responding to the emergency of a depression-plagued
economy, the New Jersey legislature in 1931 created the Municipal
Finance Commission.4 2 This act and subsequent legislation empowered the Commission to establish means for satisfying municipal debts,4 3 and prevented a municipality's creditor from availing
himself of the remedy of mandamus to force the levying of municipal taxes to pay a debt. 44 The constitutionality of the statute and
the Commission was challenged in Hourigan v. North Bergen
Township. 4' Finding that the statute had been enacted "as an
emergency measure," the court of errors and appeals held that the
interest of the state in using its police power to promote the
general good was "paramount to any rights under contracts between individuals.146 The court relied in part on the Blaisdell deci0 Id. at 439-40. The Court stated:
The reservation of state power appropriate to such extraordinary conditions [the
1930's depression] may be deemed to be as much a part of all contracts, as is the
reservation of state power to protect the public interest in the other situations to
which we have referred.
Id. at 439.
More recent decisions have relied on the police power theory in less than extraordinary
situations, although the public good is still the prime concern. See, e.g., Ruiz v. Economics
Laboratory, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 14, 15-16 (D.P.R. 1967), where a statute which was intended
to curtail abuse by principals of their franchised dealers was challenged as being unconstitutional partly because it allegedly impaired prior contract obligations between individuals.
The court observed:
"It is the settled law of this court that the interdiction of statutes impairing the
obligation of contracts does not prevent the state from exercising such powers as
are vested in it for the promotion of the common weal, or are necessary for the
general good of the public, though contracts previously entered into between
individuals may thereby be affected."
Id. at 17 (quoting from Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 480 (1905)).
4' 290 U.S. at 447.
" Law of April 28, 1931, ch. 340, [1931] N.J. Laws 830, as amended, N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 52:27-1 et seq. (1955).
41 Law of April 28, 1931, ch. 340, [1931] N.J. Laws 830, as amended, Law of June 30,
1931, ch. 384, [1931] N.J. Laws 1212,as amended, Law ofJune 14, 1932, ch. 236, [1932] N.J.
Laws 519, as amended, Law of June 27, 1933, ch. 330, [1933] N.J. Laws 859, as amended, N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 52:27-1 et. seq. (1955).
44 See Hourigan v. North Bergen Tp., 113 N.J.L. 143, 148, 172 A. 193, 196 (Ct.Err. &
App. 1934).
45 113 N.J.L. 143, 172 A. 193 (Ct.Err. & App. 1934). In Hourigan, the constitutionality
of the legislation was challenged as violative of both the federal Constitution and N.J. CONST.
art. IV, § VII, 3 (1844), which forbids the passage of any law impairing contract obligations. 113 N.J.L. at 145, 172 A. at 194-95.
16 113 N.J.L. at 148-49, 172 A. at 196.
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sion, admitting that the statute in that case was for a fixed and
limited period, while the New Jersey law was not so proscribed.4 7
Nevertheless, the court declared:
[I]t is not requisite that the operation of the law be limited to a
definite term. It is the actual existence of the emergency solely,
and not the limitation of the law's operation to a prescribed
period, that gives validity to this exercise
48 of the reserve element
of sovereignty called the police power.
While recognizing the existence of possible limits on this power,
the court stated that the legislature had "wide discretion . . . in

determining what is and what is not necessary-a discretion which
courts ordinarily will not interfere with. '4 9 Although a specified
time period was not mandated for the statute's operation, the court
noted that its useful life was limited to the duration of the
50
economic emergency which called it forth.
This legislative discretion was soon tested in Faitoute Iron &
Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park.5" The City of Asbury Park had
incurred a large municipal bond indebtedness when, in 1935, on
application of creditors to the state supreme court, the city was
"placed
under the control of the Municipal Finance
Commission."5 2 A proposal for the refunding of the bonded debt
was submitted in 193653 and approved by the court and the Finance Commission in 1937. 54 The plan was consented to in 1938
47 Id. at 151, 172 A. at 197.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 149, 172 A. at 196 (citations omitted).

50 Id. at 151-52, 172 A. at 197. The court constructed an implied repealer of the statute:
When the emergency ceases to exist, the operation of the statute will be arrested,
even though the prescribed term of its operation may not then have expired. A law
depending upon the existence of an emergency, or other certain state of facts, to
uphold it, may cease to operate if the emergency ceases, or the facts change, even
though valid when passed. It is always open to judicial inquiry whether the exigency
still exists upon which the continued operation of the law depends. The operation
of the statute itself could not validly outlast the emergency.
Id. Although the "exigency" which led to the creation of the statute-the depression-has
ceased, the Municipal Finance Commission continues in existence. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §
52:27-1 et seq. (1955). See also Schierstead v. City of Brigantine, 20 N.J. 164, 167, 119 A.2d 5,
7 (1955).
51 316 U.S. 502 (1942).
52 Id. at 503, 505. Justice Frankfurter described Asbury Park's crisis as
present[ing] a familiar picture of optimistic and extravagant municipal expansion
caught in the destructive grip of general economic depression: elaborate beachfront
improvements, costs in excess of estimates, deficits not annually met by taxation,
declining real-estate values, inability to refinance a disproportionately heavy load of
short-term obligations, and, inevitably, default.
Id. at 503.
53 Id. at 505.
54 Id. at 506.
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by creditors holding 85 percent of the city's debt. Shortly thereafter, the plan went into effect. 5 5 Faitoute Iron & Steel held bonds
and interest coupons of the city which had been issued in 1929
and 1930-prior to the creation of the Municipal Finance
Commission. 56 These securities, however, were included in the
refinancing plan, which provided for the refunding of $10,750,000
of the outstanding bonds, in exchange for new bonds which car57
ried a lower rate of interest and were to mature at a later date.
This plan was subsequently attacked as being violative of the con58
tract clause.
Writing for the Court, Justice Frankfurter went further than
did earlier cases in justifying police power on the basis of the
emergency doctrine, by stating that
[t]he necessity compelled by unexpected financial conditions to
modify an original arrangement for discharging a city's debt is
implied in every such obligation for the very reason that thereby
the obligation is discharged, not impaired. 59
As a result of this refinancing, there was no unconstitutional impairment, for "[i]mpairment of an obligation means refusal to pay
an honest debt; it does not mean contriving ways and means for
6 0°
paying it.
The financial problems which faced Asbury Park were
analyzed realistically by the Court. In upholding the legislative
action, it placed great emphasis on the fact that the law dealt with
the solvency of a municipal corporation which could meet its debts
only through taxation. 61 The Court recognized that while a city
may have unlimited taxing power in theory, it may, in practice, be
impossible to exercise this power to such an extent, due to existing
55 Id. at 506-07.
5' Id. at 507. See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
51 316 U.S. at 507.
" The challenge was based on both the federal and New Jersey constitutional guarantees against impairment of contract. The bondholders also contended that the legislation
which allowed a municipality to avoid its contractual debts was, in effect, a bankruptcy act,
thus usurping Congress' exclusive authority in that area. Id. at 507, 509.
59Id. at 511.
6o Id.

"' Id. at 509-10. The Court further observed:
The intervention of the State in the fiscal affairs of its cities is plainly an exercise of
its essential reserve power to protect the vital interests of its people by sustaining
the public credit and maintaining local government. The payment of the creditors
was the end to be obtained, but it could be maintained only by saving the resources
of the municipality--the goose which lays its golden eggs, namely, the taxes which
alone can meet the outstanding claims.
Id. at 512.
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economic conditions. 62 Thus, the Court reasoned that the only
viable approach for the enforcement of claims against a financially
receivership with
embarrassed municipality was a scheme of public
63
subordination of individual contractual claims.
A more recent illustration of contractual rights being legislatively diluted in response to an unforeseen exigency is City of El
Paso v. Simmons.6 4 Under the 1876 Texas constitution, more than

42 million acres of state-owned land were designated for sale "to
provide revenues for the public school system and to encourage
the settlement of the vast public domain. '6 5 The plan provided
that, in the event of forfeiture, the purchaser would be granted the
perpetual right of reinstatement.6 6 By 1939, many of the owners
were in default and, as a result, approximately 600,000 acres of the
designated lands lay dormant, having produced no school revenue
for more than ten years. 6 7 The discovery of oil and gas deposits
within the state had led to rampant speculation by the owners,
many of whom simply forfeited on their purchase contracts with
the state, to await the discovery of oil on their land-intending to
redeem their property under the existing reinstatement
provisions. 68 Consequently, in 1941, the Texas legislature required
that the right of reinstatement be exercised within five years of
default. 6 9 Ten years later, it further limited the right to "the last
purchaser from the State and his vendees or heirs. 70 In dealing
with this legislative action, Justice White, speaking for the Supreme
Court, upheld the law as a valid exercise of Texas' police power,
Id. at 509.
Id. at 510. The Court noted that for a municipality to survive and have its creditors
satisfied as well, three essential conditions must be met:
[I]mpartial, outside control over the finances of the city; concerted action by all the
creditors to avoid destructive action by individuals; and rateable distribution.
Id. The Court recognized that prior to the institution of the refinancing plan, the bonds had
had little value, but that after the plan was adopted, a large market existed for the new
bonds. Id. at 513.
- 379 U.S. 497 (1965).
65 Id. at 509-10. See TEX. CONST., art. 7, § 2.
66 379 U.S. at 498-99.
67 Id. at 512.
68 Id. at 511-12.
69 Id. at 499.
70 Id. The plaintiff in El Paso sought reinstatement of lands which had been forfeited to
62

63

the state by reason of non-payment of interest. He tendered the required back payments,
but his application was denied because it had not been filed within five years of the date of
forfeiture. Id. at 500-01. Three years later the land was transferred to the City of El Paso
which urgently needed it as a source of water. Id. at 516. The major issue, of course, was
whether the reduction of the reinstatement period to five years was an unconstitutional
impairment of the obligations of the original contract of sale, which had been executed
during a time when no such limit was in effect. See id. at 501.
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since it was "hardly burdensome to the purchaser who wanted to
adhere to his contract of purchase, but nonetheless an important
one to the State's interest." 1 The Court relied on Faitoute, interpreting the. impairment of contract clause as intending to protect
only " 'substantial' " contractual rights. 72 The Court observed that
the state's "promise of reinstatement ...

was not the central under-

taking of the seller nor the primary consideration for the buyer's
undertaking. ' 73 While El Paso demonstrates the continued power
of the state to alter contractual obligations in emergencies, this last
statement of the Court reveals a limit: This police power would
apply only to non-essential terms, and terms which had not induced the individuals to enter into the contractual agreement.
Where no emergency exists or the inducement to enter the
contract is impaired, legislative action will not be sustained. Thus,
the limits of reserved police power were held to have been exceeded in W. B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh.74 In that case the Court
considered an Arkansas statute which substantially changed bondholders' remedies. The bonds had been issued by a Municipal
Improvement District pursuant to a statutory authorization which
also provided for mortgage benefit assessments as security to the
purchasers. 7 5 To secure the issue, the bonds were mortgaged to a

firm of bankers which acted as trustees for the bondholders. On
the date of the issuance of the bonds, the Arkansas statute gave lot
owners thirty days from the date of the required notice for payment of assessments. If payment was not made at the end of the
period, the collector was authorized "to add a penalty of twenty per
cent, and make immediate return of delinquents to the Board of
Commissioners.

' 76

The Commissioners were required to bring

71 Id. at 516-17.
72 Id. at 515 (quoting from Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S.

502, 514 (1942)).
13 379 U.S. at 514 (emphasis added). Justice White noted:
We do not believe that it can seriously be contended that the buyer was substantially
induced to enter into these contracts on the basis of a defeasible right to reinstatement in case of his failure to perform, or that he interpreted that right to be of
everlasting effect.
Id. Relying on Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934), the Court
reaffirmed its position regarding the authority of a state to protect the interests of the
public, even if certain contract rights are thereby impaired. 379 U.S. at 508. See notes 35-41
supra and accompanying text. See also Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 310 U.S. 32,
37-38 (1940) (impairment of contractual rights of investors in building held constitutional in
light of importance of financial institutions to New Jersey's statewide credit system).
74 295 U.S. 56 (1935).
15 Id. at 57.
76 Id. at 57-58.
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foreclosure suits immediately. If the defendant failed to answer
within five days of being personally served, a decree was granted
adding the twenty percent penalty and attorney's fees to the original assessment. Ten days later, if no payment had been made, "the
property was to be sold upon twenty days notice"-the property
77
owner's only remedy being a limited right of redemption.
Three years after the bonds were issued, the Arkansas legislature drastically revised the procedure outlined above. This new
legislation extended the time allowed for payment after receiving
notice; lessened the penalty from twenty percent to three percent;
lengthened the time in which delinquent lists could be returned;
extended the time for appearance and answer; changed the time
for payment after a decree was granted from ten days to twelve
months; and extended, by six months, the waiting period after the
entering of a final default before a sale of the property would be
allowed.7" The Court also noted that the new acts failed to provide
for reimbursement of court costs and attorney's fees and that it was
no longer permissible for the purchaser "to go into possession
during the term allowed for redemption and to hold such possession without accountability for rents.

'7 9

In response to the challenge that the legislation was unconstitutional, the proponents of the statute relied on Blaisdell and the
emergency doctrine." The Court rejected the contention that a
state of emergency justified the new statutes. Justice Cardozo, writing for the Court, noted that the restrictions on the time or extent
of impairment which had been part of the legislation attacked in
Blaisdell were absent from the Arkansas statute.8 1 The Arkansas
legislature had so grossly reduced the efficacy of the bondholders'
statutory lien, which had served as their security, that it took from
the contract "the quality of an acceptable investment for a rational
investor.

'82

The Court further noted:

Ild. at 58. The Court stated that the redemption period might have been only two
years instead of five. It concluded that the exact length could not be determined since the
language of the statutes was unclear. Id.
78 Id. at 58-59.
7 Id. at 59.
80 Id. at 63.
81 Id.

Id. at 60. Speaking of the dilution of the remedy, the Court found that
[u]nder the statutes in force at the making of the contract, the property owner
was spurred by every motive of self-interest to pay his assessments if he could, and
to pay them without delay. Under the present statutes he has every incentive to
refuse to pay a dollar, either for interest or for principal.
Id. at 60-61.
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In the books there is much talk about distinctions between
changes of the substance of the contract and changes of the
remedy ....
The dividing line is at times obscure.... [However]
[n]ot even changes of the remedy may be pressed so far as to cut
down the security of a mortgage without moderation or reason
or in a spirit of oppression. Even when the public welfare is invoked
as an excuse, these bounds must be respected."3
As a result of such cases as Blaisdell, Hourigan, Faitoute, and
Worthen, it appears that legislative action which impairs a bond
contract will be permitted under exigent circumstances. However,
an emergency will not justify an impairment which destroys the
underlying security which had induced the investment or which
leaves no reasonable means of contractual enforcement.
The reserved police power of the state must be interpreted
harmoniously with limitations rooted in the contract clause. As
such, there may be no judicial
construction which would permit the State to adopt as its policy
the repudiation of debts or the destruction
of contracts or the
84
denial of means to enforce them.
The New Jersey Constitutional Provision
Before examining how the Robinson decision, the repeal of the
1962 covenant, and other recent events may affect the rights of
current and future bondholders, the relevant provision of this
state's constitution should be mentioned. The New Jersey prohibition against impairment of contract is stated more specifically than
that which appears in the federal Constitution. The 1947 New
Jersey constitution states:
The Legislature shall not pass any . . . law impairing the
obligation of contracts, or depriving a party of any remedy for
enforcing
a contract which existed when the contract was
85
made.
s' Id. at 60 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
W. B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426, 433 (1934).
N.J. CONST. art. 4, § 7, 3. For text of the federal contract clause see text accompanying note 11 supra.
The language of the New Jersey constitution of 1947 is the same as that in the prior
constitution. See N.J. CONST. art. IV, § VII, 3 (1844). In Baldwin v. Flagg, 43 N.J.L. 495
(Sup. Ct. 1881), the court established a test for determining the constitutionality of legislation impairing or depriving a party of a contract remedy:
It is perfectly clear that any law which enlarges, abridges, or in any manner changes
the intention of the parties, resulting from the stipulations in the contract, necessarily impairs it, and the manner or degree in which this change is effected can in no
respect influence the conclusion. Any deviation from its terms, by postponing or
accelerating the period of performance which it prescribes, imposing conditions not
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Despite the different language in the two clauses, the' New Jersey
' 6
supreme court has characterized them as "parallel guarantees"
8 7
and the state courts have made no distinction in their application.
THE APPLICATION OF THE IMPAIRMENT OF
CONTRACTS CLAUSE TO RECENT EVENTS

The Financing of a Thorough and Efficient Education
Local real property taxes traditionally have provided the
primary source of funds for elementary and secondary public
education in New Jersey. 88 In Robinson v. Cahill,8 9 the Supreme
Court of New Jersey unanimously held that the method of
financing public education in New Jersey did not meet the state's
constitutional requirement that every child between the ages of five
and eighteen shall receive a "thorough and efficient" free public
education. 90 While the court found that the present method of
financing public education failed to satisfy the constitutional standard, it did not hold that the imposition of local ad valorem
property taxes for educational purposes was per se unconstitutional. 9 1 The court, however, charged the state legislature with
the responsibility of developing a constitutionally acceptable
method of providing a "thorough and efficient" education within a
92
period of two years.

expressed in the contract, or dispensing with the performance of those which are
part of the contract, however minute or apparently immaterial in their effect upon
it, impairs its obligation.
Id. at 503. Accord, Klorman v. Westcliff Co., 12 N.J. Misc. 266, 269, 170 A. 251, 253 (Sup. Ct.
1934).
88
P.T. & L. Constr. Co. v. Commissioner, Dep't of Transp., 60 N.J. 308, 313, 288 A.2d
574, 577 (1972).
87 See, e.g., New Jersey Highway Auth. v. Sills, 109 N.J. Super. 424, 431, 263 A.2d 498,
501, supplemented, III N.J. Super. 313, 268 A.2d 308 (Ch. 1970), affd mem., 58 N.J. 432, 278
A.2d 489 (1971) (impairment found; police power justification rejected); New Jersey Sports
& Exposition Auth. v. McCrane, 119 N.J. Super. 457, 563-64, 292 A.2d 580, 639-40 (L. Div.
1971), affd as modified, 61 N.J. 1, 292 A.2d 545, appeal dismissed sub non. Borough of E.
Rutherford v. New Jersey Sports & Exposition Auth., 409 U.S. 943"(1972), affd on appeal
after remand sub nom. In re Sports Complex, 62 N.J. 248, 300 A.2d 337 (1973) (police power
upheld).
88 Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super. 223, 229, 287 A.2d 187, 190 (L. Div. 1972).
89 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973).
90 Id. at 515, 303 A.2d at 295. The constitutional provision examined by the court
declares:
The Legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough
and efficient system of free public schools for the instruction of all the children in
the State between the ages of five and eighteen years.
N.J. CONST. art. 8, § 4,
1.
91 See 62 N.J. at 520, 303 A.2d at 297-98.
92 63 N.J. at 198, 306 A.2d at 66.
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The Robinson decision culminates a series of attacks which had
been made upon the quality of public education provided through
the imposition of local property taxes. 93 In Serrano v. Priest,94 the
California supreme court sustained challenges that the state's
financing of public schools through the imposition of local property taxes violated the equal protection guarantees of both the
federal and state constitutions. 95 Presented with a similar attack
upon the Texas system, the Supreme Court of the United States
adopted a contrary position in San Antonio Independent School District
v. Rodriguez,9 6 rejecting a claim that federal equal protection was
being denied by the funding of public education with local property tax revenues. 9 7 In New Jersey, while the trial court in Robinson
had found various violations of federal and state consitutional
provisions, 9 the Rodriguez decision precluded any further consideration of the federal equal protection question by the state supreme court. 9 Consequently, the New Jersey supreme court's decision in Robinson was based solely on the education clause of the
New Jersey constitution.10
While local real property taxes provide revenues to meet current educational expenditures, they also provide the security for
bonds issued by local school districts to obtain funds for capital
9' For a thorough analysis of the school financing litigation see Tractenberg, supra
note 5.
9 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
Ild. at 596 n.ll, 614-15, 487 P.2d at 1249, 1263, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 609, 623.
96 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
97 Id. at 54-55.
" 118 N.J. Super. at 279-81, 287 A.2d at 216-17. The lower court found that financing
education through local property taxes discriminated against students living in districts with
lower tax bases and against taxpayers by exacting an unequal share of the tax burden,
resulting in a violation of federal and state guarantees of equal protection. The court also
held that the "thorough and efficient" education clause was not met and that the state
constitutional provisions on taxation of real property were violated. Id. The New Jersey
equal protection guarantee is implied in article 1, paragraph 1. See Washington Nat'l Ins. Co.
v. Board of Review of N.J. Unempl. Comp. Comm'n, 1 N.J. 545, 554, 64 A.2d 443, 447
(1949). Article 8, section 1, paragraph 1 of the 1947 constitution provides for uniformity of
taxation. 118 N.J. Super. at 277, 287 A.2d at 215.
99 62 N.J. at 486-90, 303 A.2d at 279-82. The New Jersey supreme court had previously
rejected a demand for strict equal protection in West Morris Regional Bd. of Educ. v. Sills,
58 N.J. 464, 279 A.2d 609 (1971), noting that
there is no constitutional fiat that educational expenditures be identical for all
students throughout the State. Benefits may indeed depend upon the district of a
student's residence.
Id. at 478, 279 A.2d at 616.
'ooSee 62 N.J. at 513, 515-16, 303 A.2d at 294-95. On the record before it, the court
declined to consider the issue of state equal protection demands vis-is-vis public services. Id.
at 500, 303 A.2d at 287.
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improvements. In the event of default on payment of the bonded
debt, the bondholders may seek to compel the levy of sufficient
taxes to provide funds for payment. Although the supreme court
struck down the present method of financing education for failing
to meet the "thorough and efficient" standard, Chief Justice Weintraub concluded his opinion by emphatically stating: "Obligations
incurred must not be impaired."1 0 1 The New Jersey legislature,
acting on the supreme court's mandate to provide a "thorough and
efficient education," is currently discussing new methods for school
financing, including a plan by which the state would assume the
entire cost, with a resulting reduction or elimination of the local
districts' financing of education by local ad valorem property
taxes.1 2 Since the holders of local school district bonds purchased
the bonds in reliance on the taxing power of the local districts, the
reduction or elimination of this taxing power may cause bondholders to feel that their contract has been impaired.
The importance which the municipal bond industry attaches to
the ad valorem tax pledge as security for "general obligation"
school bonds cannot be overemphasized. The bond attorney's approving legal opinion accompanying any such issue will include
substantially the following language:
In our opinion, the bonds are valid and legally binding general
obligations of the school district and the Board of Education has
the power and is obligated to levy ad valorem taxes upon all the
taxable real property within the school district without limitation
as to rate
or amount for the payment of the bonds and interest
10 3
thereon.
If, for any reason, -the bond attorney feels he must qualify his
opinion as to the taxing power of the district, investors will usually
be unwilling to purchase the bonds at any price. For example,
when the California decision of Serrano v. Priest was first publicized
101Id. at 520, 303 A.2d at 298.
102 Numerous bills have been introduced to meet the Robinson directive. See, e.g., N.J.
Assembly Bill No. 1644 (introduced May 6, 1974) (elimination of local property taxes and
imposition of statewide property tax); N.J. Assembly Bills Nos. 1815, 1816, 1817 & 1818
(introduced May 16, 1974), N.J. Assembly Con. Res. Nos. 160 & 161 (introduced May 16,
1974) (amendment of sales, business personal property, and corporate taxes along with
establishment of statewide property tax and constitutional amendments); N.J. Assembly Bill
No. 1863 (introduced June 13, 1974) -(local funding with state equalization aid); N.J.
Assembly BillNo. 1875 (introduced June 13, 1974) (personal income tax).
103 Approving Opinion of Kraft & Hughes, Esqs., relating to $4,980,000 bonds of the
Board of Education of the Township of Middletown, in the County of Monmouth, New
Jersey, issued January 1, 1974.
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in 1971, the municipal bond market was shaken by the news. t0 4 In
Serrano, the court had held that the very cornerstone for the
repayment of billions of dollars in outstanding obligations and
millions of dollars in proposed bond issues violated the federal
Constitution. A number of bond sales were postponed in order to
give bond attorneys the opportunity to properly evaluate the situation and to advise the industry as to. the impact of Serrano and
similar decisions. Without any reassurance from bond attorneys
that the unlimited taxing power to satisfy bond obligations remained intact, new issues were simply not marketable. Consequently, the following language was adopted:
In our opinion the bonds are valid and legally binding general
obligations of the school district and, unless paid from other
sources, are payable from ad valorem taxes levied upon all the
taxable real property within the school district without limitation
as to rate or amount.
In expressing such opinion, we have considered the litigation
recently instituted in various states, including New Jersey, challenging the constitutionality of present systems of levying taxes
and applying funds for public school purposes, and have con-

cluded that, in our opinion, such litigation, whether or not any
such system is ultimately held unconstitutional, will not affect the
validity or binding obligation of the bonds or modify the rights
of holders to ultimate recourse to unlimited ad valorem taxes
upon all the taxable real property within the school district for
the payment of the bonds if not paid from other sources, and

therefore our conclusions stated in the preceding
paragraph are
105
not modified or qualified in any respect.
This language was used during the period when the status of the
real property taxing power as security for school bonds was being
questioned as a result of the Serrano line of cases. After the Supreme Court decided Rodriguez and the New Jersey supreme court
specifically reaffirmed the validity of local school districts' bond
debts, bond attorneys reverted to the original language in approving New Jersey school bond issues.

The opinion that the local districts' pledge of their taxing
104 Wall St. Journal, Dec. 1, 1971, at 16, col. 3. The doubt was clearly expressed:

Bond underwriters in recent months have blamed the [Serrano] case for creating uncertainty in a market that last year raised more than $3.5 billion for secondary and elementary public schools. The question is whether such bonds are
valid and legally binding obligations on school districts that issue them.
Id.
10% Approving Opinion of Kraft & Hughes, Esqs., relating to $439,000 bonds of the
Board of Education of the Buena Regional School District, in the County of Atlantic, New
Jersey, issued March 1, 1973.
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power to repay school bonds will remain viable, even if the legislature eliminates the local property tax, is based on the constitutional
protection of the contract clause. If New Jersey adopts a new
system of financing education which dilutes the local property tax
levy, the bondholder probably will be paid with money from different sources. There may be a different tax imposed, such as a
statewide income or property tax, or payments may be made by the
state rather than the local districts. As long as the bondholder is
paid, there is no problem. However, if the obligation of the bonds
is not satisfied by the new source, the bondholder still has his right
to enforce the original pledge of the local school district to levy
property taxes sufficient to pay the bonds.
Florida bondholders faced an analogous situation during the
early 1930's. The City of Fort Lauderdale in 1926 issued general
obligation negotiable bonds in the amount of $2 million for its
share of the cost of a harbor project, now known as Port Everglades, which had been jointly undertaken with another
municipality. 10 6 The harbor was subsequently placed under the
control of a newly created taxing district, consisting of the two
municipalities and additional territory. 10 7 In place of payment
from the city's general taxing power, the legislature provided that
the port district would meet bond payments through the imposition of a special assessment tax.10 8 The Florida legislature intended
"to relieve the cities involved of the payment of their bonds and to
assume on the part of the taxing district the primary obligation."'' 0 9
Unfortunately, the new district failed to meet the payments
and bondholders sought to compel the city, by a writ of mandamus, to utilize its taxing power to raise sufficient funds to pay
the obligations, as had been originally pledged.1 10 In City of Fort
Lauderdale v. State ex rel. Elston Bank & Trust Co.,"' the Florida
supreme court unanimously held that the legislature could not
constitutionally release the city from liability, where the city had
pledged its unlimited ad valorem property tax revenues for
repayment." 2
The court recognized that, as long as the bond payments were
106

City of Fort Lauderdale v. State ex rel. Elston Bank & Trust Co., 125 Fla. 89, 91-92,

169 So. 584,
107 Id. at
108 Id. at
109 Id. at
11 Id. at

585 (1936).
92, 169 So. at
94, 169 So. at
92, 169 So. at
92-93, 169 So.

585.
586.
585.
at 585.

1 i25 Fla. 89, 169 So. 584 (1936).
d. at 94, 169 So. at 586.

2
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made, the state could change boundaries of the taxing district,
substitute a new taxing district as the immediate payor, or substitute a new tax as the source for repayment.' 13 But, basing its
decision on a "well settled" judicial interpretation of the federal
and state constitutional prohibitions against impairment of contract, the court stated that "the authority and ability" to levy taxes
for payment was "a vital part of the bond contract" and could not
be withdrawn by the legislature.' 14
If the New Jersey legislature, responding to the Robinson mandate, were to develop a financing program where the state would
assume the cost of educational services and make payment on local
school district bonds, this would not extinguish the local districts'
entire obligation. As in Fort Lauderdale, should the state default in
its payments, the bondholders will still have the right to compel the
local districts to levy taxes.
Even if the bondholders approved the releasing of local school
districts and the substituting of the state as obligor, the legislature
could not assume all of the local districts' bond debts simply by
' See id. at 98, 169 So. at 587. The court stated that
it is utterly immaterial to a public creditor how he gets his money to discharge his
indebtedness so long as he is being paid from some source sufficient to discharge
what is his due ....

Id.
114 Id. at 96, 169 So. at 587. See also Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.)
535, 554 (1866) (by implication).
The plaintiff in Von Hoffman held interest coupons on bonds which had been issued by
the city. At the time of their issuance, the Illinois legislature had authorized municipalities to
levy a tax to pay for the existing debt. Id. at 535-36. After the coupons were issued the state
legislature placed a taxing ceiling on the amount the municipalities could tax its residents.
See id. at 536-37. When the coupons became due, the city defaulted and, in compliance with
state law, declined to levy a tax which would exceed twenty-eight cents per one-hundred
dollars. Id. The bondholder petitioned the court to issue a writ of mandamus requiring the
city to levy a tax sufficient to pay the existing debt. Id. at 536. The Court held that the state
law which permitted the city to levy such a tax was still in effect, and that subsequent
legislation which had limited its taxing powers was not controlling. Id. at 554-55. Emphasizing that the state could not impair the obligation of the city's contract, the Court concluded:
It is equally clear that where a State has authorized a municipal corporation to
contract and to exercise the power of local taxation to the extent necessary to meet
its engagements, the power thus given cannot be withdrawn until the contract is
satisfied. The State and the corporation, in such cases, are equally bound.
Id.
The decision in Von Hoffman could have a substantial impact in New Jersey, should a
similar problem arise concerning a bondholder and the taxing power of a local school
district. If the New Jersey legislature should pass a law placing a limitation on the local
district's power to raise taxes, in conjunction with a statewide tax, the state would not be
legally bound to pay the bond debt in the event of default by the local district. See notes 11517 infra and accompanying text. As suggested by Von Hoffman, if sufficient moneys could not
be raised, the bondholder could compel the local district to impose taxes at a rate higher
than that mandated by the legislature.
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passing a law. The New Jersey constitution contains a "debt limitation.clause,"' 1 5 which establishes a specific procedure by which the
state may incur a debt of this magnitude: When the debt will
exceed one percent of the total general appropriations for that
fiscal year, the legislature must enact a statute specifying a "single
object or work"; the statute must provide the method by which this
debt will be repaid, with discharge of the debt to be within
thirty-five years; there can be no repeal of the law until
discharge. 1 6 The constitution further mandates that
[n]o such law shall take effect-until it shall have been submitted
to the people at a general election and approved by a majority of
the legally qualified voters of the State voting thereon.117
At present it seems highly unlikely that the legislature would present such a proposal to the people. The debt limitation clause,
however, does not prohibit the state from aiding in the payment of
the local school districts' bonds.
There is precedent in New Jersey for the state paying principal and interest on bonds issued for school purposes. Under the
Additional State School Building Aid Act of 1970,118 and the

County College Bond Act of 1971,119 the legislature established a
plan by which the state undertakes to pay debt service on bonds
issued by school districts and counties for county college purposes
as a form of state aid.12 ° The County College Bond Act makes it
N.J. CONST. art. 8, § 2,
3.
Id.
117 Id.
"IsN.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:58-33.6 etseq. (Supp. 1974-75). See also id. § 18A:58-21 et seq.
(School Building Aid Law).
119 Id. § 18A:64A-22.1 et seq.
120 In Holster v. Board of Trustees of Passaic County College, 59 N.J. 60, 279 A.2d 798
(1971), the court construed the County College Bond Act. The court found that the intent
of the act was to effect a cost-sharing plan by which the state and any individual county
would contribute equally to the financial support of a county college. The bonds issued by
the county become, in fact, the state's share of the capital outlay expense, providing, of
course, that the state appropriates sufficient funds to meet the bonded indebtedness on
principal and interest. Id. at 64, 279 A.2d at 800. See also New Jersey Turnpike Auth. v.
Parsons, 3 N.J. 235, 242-43, 69 A.2d 875, 878-79 (1949) (bond issue of New Jersey Turnpike
Authority did not exceed debt limitation clause because public corporations are independent
entities and state is not liable for their debts if the state clearly disclaimed liability in the
bond authorization statute); City of Passaic v. Consolidated Police-& Firemen's Pension Fund
Comm'n, 18 N.J. 137, 147, 113 A.2d 22, 27 (1955) (statutory authorization for state
contribution to a consolidated pension fund not contrary to debt limitation dause because
the statute did not incur debts, but rather provided for annual contributions).
The Holster court interpreted these cases as establishing that such "projected or anticipated future legislative appropriation is not a present debt or liability. A future legislature is
not bound to make the appropriation." 59 N.J. at 71, 279 A.2d at 804.
115

116
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clear that the bonds themselves do not constitute obligations or
debts of the state of New Jersey.

2

' Rather, the bonds are obliga-

tions of the counties which issue them and the commitment of the
state to pay debt service is one which must be renewed each year
through the Annual Appropriation Act.1 22 If, in any future year,
the state were not to appropriate funds for these payments, it
would not violate any contractual obligation to bondholders, who
then would have to look to the issuers of the bonds for payment.
The constitutionality of this method of annual state aid for school
purposes was challenged as being violative of the debt limitation

23
clause in Holster v. Board of Trustees of Passaic County College. 1

Finding no binding obligation on the state, the supreme court held
that
both issuing counties and purchasing bondholders are on notice
that the faith and credit of the State will not be pledged in
respect of bonds issued pursuant to this enactment, but that payment on the part of the State will be dependent upon appropriations provided from time to time. Lacking such appropriations,
recourse can be had only against the county which will have no recourse
over against the State.12 4

If the legislature were to establish a statewide tax to meet the
constitutional mandate of Robinson and, coupled with that tax, were
to curtail the power of local school districts to impose property
taxes, the state may be substituted as the primary taxing and
paying entity for school bonds. Such a substitution, however, would
not bind the state in the future nor would it release the local
districts from their validly incurred obligations. In the unlikely
event that the state were to follow the procedure prescribed by the
debt limitation clause and bind itself to this obligation, it could not
force the bondholders to accept the state as their new contractual
partner. Not only the state-but also the bondholders-must consent
to this new arrangement as a novation of their contract in order to
121 N.J. STAT. Ann. § 18A:64A-22.8 (Supp. 1974-75) provides:

Bonds or notes issued under the provisions of this act shall not be deemed to
constitute a debt or liability of the State or a pledge of the faith and credit of the
State but are dependent for repayment upon appropriations provided by law from
time to time.
Similarly, bonds issued under the Additional State School Building Aid Act of 1970 are
not debts of the state, but are solely the obligations of the issuing local district. Although
there is no express disclaimer of state liability, the Act does declare that state payments of
debt service are "on behalf of the school district or municipality issuing such bonds." Id. §
18A:58-33.18 (emphasis added).
122 Id. § 18A:64A-22.8.
123 59 N.J. 60, 279 A.2d 798 (1971).
124 Id. at 66-67, 279 A.2d at 801 (emphasis added).
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release the local districts from their obligations. 12 5 In all probability, this two-prong test of the debt limitation clause and bilateral
consent will not be met. The federal and state impairment of
contract clauses will require that ultimate responsibility for the
repayment of the school bond debt remain with the local districts
and their residents.
The Repeal of the 1962 Statutory Covenant

The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey is an agency
created in 1921 by a compact between the two states.1 2 6 The Port
Authority district comprises an area of about 1500 square miles in
both states, centering upon New York harbor. 12 7 As required by
29
the Constitution,1 28 Congress approved the bi-state compact.1
The purpose of the states in establishing the Authority was to
provide "terminal, transportation and other facilities of commerce"
within the continually expanding port district.130 To achieve this
end, the states have periodically authorized the construction or
operation of specific facilities 31 and have empowered the Authority to assess charges for the use of such facilities and to raise capital
by issuing bonds or other obligations.1 32 The Port Authority, however, has neither the power to tax nor the power to pledge the
credit of the two states in support of its activities.13 3 It relies solely

upon its revenues to meet operational expenses and the principal
and interest payments on its bonded indebtedness.
125 See City of Fort Lauderdale v. State ex rel. Elston Bank & Trust Co., 125 Fla. at 95,
169 So. at 586, where the Florida supreme court stated:
The Legislature cannot constitutionally release an existing municipality from
all liability for payment of its validly incurred debts, even though it imposes liability
therefore upon another public entity, unless the creditor accepts the new arrangement as a novation amounting to an extinguishment of the pre-existing
promise ....
12' N.J. STAT. ANN. § 32:1-1 et seq. (1963);

N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS § 6401 et seq.
(McKinney 1961).
1M7 This area encompasses the cities of New York and Yonkers in New York State,
Newark and Jersey City in New Jersey, and more than two hundred other municipalities,
including all or part of seventeen counties in the two states. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 32:1-3
(1963); N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAws § 6403 (McKinney 1961).
2S U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
129 H.R. Res. 337, 67th Cong., 2d Sess., 42 Stat. 822 (1922); S.J. Res. 88, 67th Cong., 1st
Sess., 42 Stat. 174 (1921).
130 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 32:1-1 (1963); N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS § 6401 (McKinney 1961).
'a'
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 32:1-8 (1963); id. §§ 32:1-25 to-140passim; N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS
§ 6408 (McKinney 1961); id. §§ 6451-6778 passim.
'3z N.J. STAT. ANN. § 32:1-7 (1963); N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS § 6407 (McKinney 1961).
'33 N.J. SWAT. ANN. §§ 32:1-8 to -9 (1963); N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS §§ 6408-6409 (McKinney 1961).
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In the early 1960's New York and New Jersey determined that
the Port Authority should undertake the construction of the World
Trade Center, a twin-towered office complex in lower Manhattan,
and should acquire and operate the Hudson and Manhattan Railroad system-subsequently known as PATH-a bankrupt, mass
transit rail link between the two states. 13 4 For the Port Authority to
accomplish this monumental project, massive amounts of additional capital were required. The New Jersey legislature authorized
a senate committee, chaired by Senator Frank S. Farley, to investigate the proposed undertaking.1 35 During extensive hearings held
over a two-year period, 3 6 the Farley Committee discovered that
prospective investors were greatly concerned that the operation of
deficit rail systems would sap the Port Authority's financial
strength. The recent collapse of many private railroads demonstrates the precarious financial footing of mass rail transit and
underscores the concern felt by the prospective Port Authority
bond investors. To attract the funds of the very conservative investors who place their money in fixed income "municipals," the
Farley Committee reported to the legislature that it was necessary
for the state to give these investors a statutory pledge of fiscal
responsibility. 3 7 The need for such an assurance was demonstrated by the testimony of then Vice-Chairman of the Port Authority, James C. Kellogg, III. His testimony indicated that without
this pledge, the Authority might not be able to obtain the necessary
funds, even at a higher rate of interest. He expressed the unanimous opinion of the Port Authority Commissioners:
[T]here is no possibility whatsoever of borrowing the money at
all without a statutory assurance to investors that any future Port
" See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 32:1-35.50 et seq. (1963); N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAws § 6601 et seq.
(McKinney 1961).
"I N.J. Senate Res. No. 7 (1960), reproduced in [1960] N.J. SENATE JOUR. 776, continued, N.J. Senate Res. No. 7 (1961), reproduced in [1961] N.J. SENATE JOUR. 41-42.
136 Hearings on the FinancialStructure and Operations of the Port of New York Authority Before
N.J. Sen. Comm'n (1960-62) [hereinafter cited as Port Authority Hearings]. Public hearings were
-held on Sept. 27-28, 1960, on Jan. 26-27, 1961, on May 5, 1961, and on Aug. 30, 1962.
137 SPECIAL INVESTIGATING COMM. OF THE N.J. SENATE, REPORT UNDER S. REs. No. 7, at
23-24 (1963) [hereinafter cited as SPECIAL REPORT]. Characterizing the threat to the Port
Authority's credit from the proposed undertaking of deficit rail activities as "a valid and real
one," the Committee report stated:
If the Port Authority were to receive such unrestricted responsibility, there is no
question but that its sound credit position would be seriously impared [sic], if not
destroyed, and it would become impossible for the Authority to continue to move
forward either with such a rail program or with other vital transportation and
terminal facilities and other facilities of commerce desired by the 2 States in
continuing the Port Authority's tradition as a public agency.
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Authority responsibilities in the field of commuter rail transport
over and above the present and existing interstate Hudson and
Manhattan railroad system will not involve a pledge of the Port
Authority's General Reserve Fund.
• . . [This] simply represents the realities of investment
financing and the Port Authority's credit. My business is investment financing and I say to you gentlemen that I could not sell a
single Port Authority bond without such an assurance. If my
responsibility were on the other side of the table, I would not 1buy
38
a Port Authority bond that did not contain such an assurance.

After taking testimony, the Committee sponsored legislation
designed to assure prospective bondholders that Port Authority
revenues would not be eroded by unlimited railroad operations
deficits.1 3 9 This statutory pledge, enacted in 1962,140 did not prohibit the Port Authority from acquiring or engaging in mass rail
transit, as long as specified financial conditions were satisfied. The

Port Authority could, at any time, acquire a "self-supporting" railroad facility.14 ' The proposal also authorized the acquisition and
operation of non-self-supporting railroad facilities if the deficits
generated were within prescribed limits. 1 4 2 A formula involving the
Port Authority's equity, reserves, and dollar amount of outstanding

bonds, determined if a proposed operation was within the "permitted deficits."1

43

The states of New Jersey and New York, in a

138 Port Authority Hearings of Jan. 27, 1961, supra note 136, at 22. See also SPECIAL
REPORT, supra note 137, at 21-23.
'39 SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 137, at 24. The Committee recommended legislation

[l]imiting by a constitutionally-protected statutory covenant with Port Authority
bondholders the extent to which the Port Authority revenues and reserves pledged
to such bondholders can in the future be applied to the deficits of possible future
Port Authority passenger railroad facilities beyond the original Hudson & Manhattan Railroad system ....
Id.
'40 Law of Feb. 13, 1962, ch. 8, § 6, [1962] N.J. Laws 47; Law of March 27, 1962, ch.
209, § 6, [1962] N.Y. Laws 418.
"I' Parallel legislation in New Jersey and New York provided:
[Tjhe port authority shall have first certified either that said other railroad facility is
self-supporting as hereinafter defined or, if not, that at the end of the preceding
calendar year the general reserve fund contained an amount equal to [1/10] of the
par value of bonds of the port authority which were outstanding at said year end
and which were legal for investment as defined in the general reserve fund statutes
and that the group of facilities consisting of such other railroad facility and of all
prior other railroad facilities will not produce deficits in excess of permitted deficits
as hereinafter defined.
Law of Feb. 13, 1962, ch. 8,§ 6, [1962] N.J. Laws 49; Law of March 27, 1962, ch. 209, § 6,
[1962] N.Y. Laws 419.
142 Law of Feb. 13, 1962, ch. 8, § 6, [1962] N.J. Laws 50; Law of March 27, 1962, ch.
209, § 6, [1962] N.Y. Laws 419.
14'The concurrent statutory sections set out this formula as follows:
"Permitted deficits" of a group of railroad facilities as used in this section, shall
mean deficits as of the time of any certification hereunder which do not exceed (A)

1974]

MUNICIPAL BONDHOLDERS' RIGHTS

pledge now known as the "1962 covenant," did "covenant and
agree with each other and with the holders of any affected
bonds" 144 that this formula would be respected. The statute, with
the 1962 covenant, passed both houses of the New Jersey legislature on February 13, 1962, without a dissenting vote. 145 Governor
Richard Hughes signed the bill on the same day. 146 The New York
legislature passed concurrent legislation, which then Governor
Nelson Rockefeller signed on March 27, 1962.147 Emphasizing the
size of the investment-$420 million-Governor Rockefeller noted
that neither state tax money nor state credit would be used in the
project. 148
After the pledge was enacted by both states, private individuals, in reliance on the covenant, invested over $1 billion in Port
Authority bonds at very moderate rates of interest. 149 As a result of
the huge investment made by thousands of bondholders since
such amount or amounts of deficits as of the time of any certification hereunder for
the payment of which one or both of the [2 States], in connection with the proposed
other railroad facility as to which the certification is made and in connection with
prior other railroad facilities, has made adequate, secure and effective provision for
the duration of the period for which the port authority is liable for such deficits,
plus (B) the greater of the following [2] amounts: (1) an amount equal to [1/10] of
the amount in the general reserve fund at the end of the preceding calendar year,
diminished by an amount equal to [1%] of the principal amount of all bonds of the
port authority outstanding at the end of said preceding calendar year the proceeds
of which shall have been applied for purposes in connection with the facilities of
such group or (2) an amount equal to the sum of [1/10] of the diminished [1/10]
amount calculated under clause (1) of this sentence, plus [1%] of the equity, at the
end of the said preceding calendar year, of the port authority in its vehicular
bridges and tunnels and in all other facilities owned and operated by it (not
including railroad cars financed by state-guaranteed bonds) except those of the
aforesaid group of railroad facilities.'
Law of Feb. 13, 1962, ch. 8, § 6, [1962] N.J. Laws 50; Law of March 27, 1962, ch. 209, § 6,
[1962] N.Y. Laws 419.
"' Law of Feb. 13, 1962, ch. 8, § 6, [1962] N.J. Laws 47; Law of March 27, 1962, ch.
209, § 6, [1962] N.Y. Laws 418.
145 [1962] N.J. GEN. Ass'v MINUTES 240-42; [1962] N.J. SENATE JOUR. 182.
146

SPECIAL REPORT,

supra note 137, at 26.

"' Law of March 27, 1962, ch. 209, [1962] N.Y. Laws 412-27.
141 Message of the Governor of the State of New York on approving Law of March 27,
1962, ch. 209, [1962] N.Y. Laws 3613. The governor stated:
According to preliminary estimates, the total cost of this vast port development
project [acquiring the Hudson and Manhattan Railroad, and developing the World
Trade Center] will be substantially in excess of $420 million. These capital sums will
be raised by the Port Authority on its own credit without recourse to the taxing
powers or credit of either state or any of their municipalities.
To preserve the Port Authority's credit strength the bill includes a covenant by
the two States that additional deficit financing of future railroad projects will only
be undertaken within the financial limits set forth in their covenant.
Id. at 3614.
149 See THE PORT.AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY, OFFICIAL STATEMENT ON
$100,000,000 CONSOLIDATED BONDS, FORTY-FIRST SERIES, App.

ter cited

as OFFICIAL STATEMENT].

1, at 33-34 (1973) [hereinaf-
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1962, the World Trade Center has been completed and PATH
now transports its passengers in new, air-conditioned cars at lower
fares than were in effect at the time the Port Authority took over
the railroad.
Shortly after their enactment, the statutes empowering the
Authority to take over the Hudson and Manhattan railroad and to
build the World Trade Center were attacked in Courtesy Sandwich
Shop, Inc. v. Port of New York Authority.1 5 0 The plaintiffs had contended that since no congressional consent had been obtained for
the recent bi-state legislation, it violated the compact clause of the
Constitution. 15 t The Court of Appeals of New York held that no
additional consent was necessary, since Congress' approval in 1921
and 1922 of the creation of "the Port Authority expressly contemplated such further co-operative legislation in furtherance of port
purposes. ' 15 2 The United States Supreme Court dismissed an ap1 53
peal "for want of a substantial federal question.

In Kheel v. Port of New York Authority, 5 4 the 1962 covenant was
specifically attacked. 15 5 A violation of the compact clause was again
alleged, but the district court held that "Courtesy Sandwich Shop
forecloses the claim. 1

56

Plaintiffs also argued that the covenant's

formula for protecting bondholders effected "a constitutionally
impermissible delegation of future legislative authority to provide
1 57
for mass transit facilities to private persons, the bondholders."
The court held that the claim of" 'legislative divestment' " must fail
not only legally but also pragmatically since the covenant does not
prohibit the states from solving "mass transit problems by other
means, e.g. by enactment of subsidy programs." 158 This rendered
the constitutional questions "illusory. 159
12 N.Y.2d 379, 190 N.E.2d 402, 240 N.Y.S.2d 1, appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 78 (1963).
12 N.Y.2d at 391, 190 N.E.2d at 406, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 7. The plaintiffs had also
challenged the statutes as effecting a "taking of private property by eminent domain for
other than a public use" in violation of the fifth and fourteenth amendments and section 7
of article I of New York's constitution. 12 N.Y.2d at 387, 190 N.E.2d at 404, 240 N.Y.S.2d at
4. Plaintiff's property had been condemned by the Port Authority to make room for
construction of the World Trade Center. Id.
152 12 N.Y.2d at 391,
190 N.E.2d at 406, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 7.
153 375 U.S. 78 (1963).
154 331 F. Supp. 118 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), affd, 457 F.2d 46 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
983 (1972).
155 331 F. Supp. at 119.
151 Id. at 121. The court noted that while no consent was given to the new legislation,
Congress still retained a veto power. The court also rejected the claim that the 1962
covenant infringed upon Congress' commerce clause powers "[flor analogous reasons." Id.
157 Id. at 119.
150
151

158

Id. at 122.

159

Id.
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The 1962 covenant is not a "legislative divestment," since the
decision of whether to enter the field of mass transit remains with
the Port Authority. The covenant simply provides the requisite
security to attract and safeguard the necessary investment capital.
Although protection of bondholders' interest was afforded by a
1952 bond resolution,1 6 the Farley Committee's investigation
showed that a more concrete assurance was necessary. t6 t The importance of the 1962 covenant to the affected bondholders is that it
provides a part of the underlying security for their investment by
setting forth an objective test regulating deficits which may be
incurred in connection with rail operations. 62 This objective formula acts as a check, in the bondholders' interest, on the discretion
of the Port Authority's commissioners.
Following the success of the Port Authority's undertaking of
PATH and the World Trade Center, the two states apparently felt
that this pledge was no longer needed to attract future investors.
Accordingly, in 1972, both states amended the 1962 covenant to
provide that neither state would be bound by it as to any future
issues of bonds. 163 In enacting the 1972 amendment, however,
both states reaffirmed that the holders of more than $1 billion
in outstanding bonds could continue to rely on the original
covenant. 6 4 The New Jersey legislature's statement demonstrates
their intent:
The bill is also designed to preclude the application of the
1962 covenant to holders of bonds newly issued after the effective date of this act, while maintainingin status quo the rights of the
holders of the bonds issued after March 27, 1962 (the effective
date of the 1962 65covenant legislation) but prior to the effective
date of this act.'
Within two years, however, both states repealed the solemn legal
pledge twice made by statute to the bondholders. 6
160 Consolidated Bond Resolution (adopted Oct. 9,

1952), reproduced in

OFFICIAL

supra note 149, App. V, at 55-71.
1' See notes 138-40 supra and accompanying text.
162 See note 143 supra.
183 Law of Dec. 28, 1972, ch. 208, § 2, [1972] N.J. Laws 801; Law of June 8, 1972, ch.

STATEMENT,

1003, § 1, [1972] N.Y. Laws 3143.
164 Law of Dec. 28, 1972, ch. 208, § 3, [1972] N.J. Laws 802; Law of May 10, 1973, ch.
318, § 2, [1973] N.Y. Laws 448. In its 1972 amendment, the New York legislature had
attempted to repeal the protection of the 1962 covenant completely; however, the New
Jersey legislature refused to enact such an amendment. Since the New York statute required
concurrent legislation in New Jersey, the complete repeal was not accomplished in 1972.
165 N.J. Assembly Bill No. 1565 (introduced Nov. 16, 1972) (emphasis added).
166 Law of April 30, 1974, ch. 25, 1 N.J. SEss. LAW SERV. 34 (1974); Law of June 15,
1974, ch. 993, 9 N.Y. S~ss. LAw

NEWS

1590 (1974).
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The constitutionality of the repeal has been questioned from
the moment of its inception. Governor Malcolm Wilson of New
York recognized the existence of the controversy when he signed
the repeal into law on June 15, 1974, stating:
It is with great reluctance that I approve a bill that overturns
a solemn pledge of the State. I take this extraordinary step only
because it will lead to an end of the existing controversy over the
validity of the statutory covenant, a controversy that can only
have an adverse effect upon the administration and financing of
the Port Authority, and because it will lead to a speedy resolution
by the courts of the questions and issues concerning the validity
of the statutory covenant.1 67
The bondholders' trustee has subsequently instituted suit, challeng168
ing the repeal as an unconstitutional impairment of contract.
The action of the two states in repealing the covenant is far
more offensive than are other instances in which the impairment
of contract issue has been raised. In most other cases, state legislative action has affected contractual rights where the state itself was
not a party, such as those between a mortgagor and a mortgagee or
a bondholder and a municipality. In this situation, however, the
states of New York and New Jersey are parties to the contract and
each has sought to repudiate its own solemn contractual covenant
unilaterally.
By repealing the covenant, the states have not simply modified
the bondholders' remedy or changed a procedural means of enforcement, so that there would be no impairment of the
obligation. 169 Consequently, the validity of the repeal must rest
upon the police power exception. Perceiving a mass transit
emergency, the legislatures deemed this repeal a valid exercise of
that police power.1 7 ° While a state's police power can, of course,
"67

Memorandum of the Governor of the State of New York on approving Law of June
15, 1974, ch. 993, 9 N.Y. SEss. LAw NEws A-362 (1974).
"ll Complaint, United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, No. L-26861-73 (N.J. Super. Ct.,
L. Div., April 30, 1974). Plaintiff is the trustee for the fortieth and forty-first series of Port
Authority bonds, as well as a bondholder, and brought suit in its capacity as trustee to
protect and act on behalf of the individual bondholders. Id. at 2-3. The complaint alleges
that the retroactive repeal of the 1962 covenant constituted an impairment of the bondholders' contracts in violation of the New Jersey and federal constitutions. Id. at 16. In
addition, it alleges that the repeal constituted a taking of the bondholders' property without
just compensation in violation of the fifth and fourteenth amendments and of the state
constitution. Id. at 17. Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment that the repeal is void. Id. at 18.
1 9 See notes 28-32 supra and accompanying text.
1"0 Answer and Counterclaim at 6, United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, No.
L-26861-73 (N.J. Super. Ct., L. Div., July 15, 1974). As one of their defenses, the defendants
pleaded:
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never be "bargain[ed] away,"'' it can only be exercised within
constitutional limits.
This recent legislative action should be compared with the
statutes considered in New Jersey Highway Authority v. Sills, '

72

which,

in 1970, reaffirmed the proposition that bondholders' contract
rights vis-a-vis the state are constitutionally protected from unilateral legislative impairment. In Sills, the trial court examined two
1968 statutes which attempted to exempt national guardsmen and
military reservists from paying tolls on bridges, ferries, or toll
roads while going to or returning from duty. 73 The Highway
Authority had previously issued revenue bonds to finance construction. The payment of principal and interest was to be made
,primarily from tolls.' 74 The proposed exemption was incontravention of a statutory pledge made by the state to the holders of the
Highway Authority bonds that the Authority and not the state
would have the sole power to set and collect tolls.1 75 The yearly loss

of revenue resulting from the exemption only would have
amounted to approximately $27,300 of total revenues in excess of
$46 million.' 76 The exemption was struck down as an unconstitutional impairment of contract.1 77 In a supplemental opinion, the
court rejected the claim that the police power of the state could be
1 78
invoked to justify the statutory exemption.
The use of the police power to impair contracts has been
sustained when legislatures have responded to real emergencies
through temporary measures.' 79 Unlike the statute upheld in
Blaisdell, the repeal of the 1962 covenant is not a suspension of
contract rights. Instead, it-purports to permanently deprive bondThe 1974 Act constitutes a reasonable exercise of the police powers of the State
of New Jersey to protect the health, safety and welfare of its citizens. These police
powers are fundamental to the sovereignty of the State and cannot be abdicated.
Id. The Attorney General of New Jersey is not actively defending the suit. Instead, Michael I.
Sovern, a member of the New York bar and dean of the Columbia University School of Law,
has been retained as special counsel for the state.
'71See, e.g., Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 817 (1879).
172 109 N.J. Super. 424, 263 A.2d 498, supplemented, 111 N.J. Super. 313, 268 A.2d 308
(Ch. 1970), affd mem., 58 N.J. 432,.278 A.2d 489 (1971).
173 109 N.J. Super. at 426, 263 A.2d at 499 (citing Law of Jan. 14, 1969, ch. 414, [1968]
N.J. Laws 1431; Law of Nov. 25, 1968, ch. 352, [1968] N.J. Laws 1162).
174 109 N.J. Super. at 426-27, 263 A.2d at 499.
175Id. at 427-28, 263 A.2d at 499-500 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 27:12B-9, -14 (1966)).
171 111 N.J. Super. at 315, 268 A.2d at 309.
17 109 N.J. Super. at 431, 263 A.2d at 501. The court reaffirmed this conclusion in its
supplemental opinion. 111 N.J. Super. at 322, 268 A.2d at 313.
171 111 N.J. Super. at 319-20, 268 A.2d at 312.
1 See notes 35-63 supra and accompanying text.
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holders of the protection afforded by the 1962 covenant. The
supposed repeal is not "limited to the exigency which called it
forth,"' 8 0 nor is there any benefit to the bondholders. In contrast
to the decision in Faitoute, where the Supreme Court emphasized
that the challenged legislation benefited both the municipality and
bondholders, the repeal at issue here favors only one party to the
contract. In Faitoute, the legislation increased the likelihood of
repayment, while the removal of the 1962 covenant's protection,
with possible dilution of Port Authority revenues, increases the
chances of non-payment.
In examining a legislature's alleged exercise of police power, a
court will look to see if the right impaired was a "primary consideration for the buyer's undertaking." 8 ' In 1962, when the states
sought to have the Port Authority undertake the World Trade
Center- and PATH projects, it was as much in their interest as
the bondholders' to provide the statutory protection of the
covenant.1 8 2 As testimony before the Farley Committee established,
the Authority, without this pledge, "could not sell a single Port
1
Authority bond."

8 3

A bond investor is willing to take a relatively fixed risk in
exchange for a fixed return. The type of risk is then utilized in
determining the amount of interest he will require for the use of
his capital. The 1962 covenant was enacted in order to attract large
sums of capital by setting limits on the risk which the Port Authority could undertake in the precarious area of deficit rail operations.
Since the Port Authority lacks the power to tax or to pledge the
credit of either state, the covenant was designed to protect the only
source for payment of expenses and over $1 billion in bond
obligations-the Authority's revenues. To remove this protection is
to take from the bond contract "the quality of an acceptable investment for a rational investor," of which Justice Cardozo spoke in
W. B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh.184 The Port Authority bondholders were given no opportunity to renegotiate the rate of interest
in relationship to the increased risk. As was stated in Worthen,
180 Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 447 (1934).

For further

discussion see notes 35-41 supra and accompanying text.
'll City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 514 (1965). For further discussion see
notes 64-73 supra and accompanying text.
82 See notes 137-38 supra and accompanying text.
's3 Port Authority Hearings ofJan. 27, 1961, supra note 136, at 22. See note 138 supra and
accompanying text.
184 295 U.S. 56, 60 (1935). For further discussion see notes 74-83 supra and accompanying text.
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"[e]ven when the public welfare is invoked as an excuse, ' 85 the
security of an investment cannot be restricted to such an unreasonable extent.
The full financial impact of the repeal has not yet been felt as
the Port Authority has not issued any new bonds since the two
states acted to repeal the covenant. There is considerable sentiment
in the investment and banking community that, because of the
repeal of the covenant, the Port Authority will find it difficult or
impossible to market any major new issues of bonds. The ultimate
penalty of this action, however, is that the repeal will weaken
investor confidence not only in the Authority, but also in the
integrity of the states of New Jersey and New York.
Investor confidence takes on greater significance when a state
agency attempts to issue bonds secured not by a legal pledge but
solely through the state's "moral pledge." The moral pledge is a
euphemism which is utilized to describe provisions in statutes creating various state agencies with the power to issue revenue bonds.
These provisions generally declare that, in the event revenueproducing operations of the state agency do not generate sufficient
funds to pay debt service and operating costs and to maintain
reserves, the state will appropriate and pay over to the agency
sufficient moneys to meet the deficit. This moral pledge, however,
does not create a legally binding obligation on the legislature to
make future payments. The pledge must be legally non-binding;
otherwise the debt limitation clause of the state constitution would
be violated.1 86 As in the Additional State School Building Aid
Act 8 7 and the County College Bond Act,' 88 each future legislature
is free to appropriate or not appropriate any necessary funds.1 8 9
Future legislatures are subject only to the "moral pressure" of the
statutory provisions and the reality that investors had purchased
the agency's bond with the expectation that this moral pledge
would be honored.
More than $6 billion in bonds have been "secured" by moral
pledges enacted by eleven states.' 90 New York and New Jersey are
185 295 U.S. at 60.
186
187

See notes 115-17 supra and accompanying text.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:58-33.6 et seq. (Supp. 1974-75). See notes 118-24 supra and

accompanying text.
I

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:64A-22.1 et seq. (Supp. 1974-75). See notes 119-24supra and

accompanying text.
189 See notes 120 & 125 supra and accompanying text.
190 66 MOODY's BOND SURVEY 771 (1974).
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"prominent among these issuers. '"191 Recently, for example, the
New Jersey Sports and Exposition Authority issued more than
$300 million of bonds "backed" by the moral peldge of the State of
New Jersey.19 2 The practical importance of the pledge was recognized by Justice Francis, speaking for the majority of the New
Jersey supreme court, in New Jersey Sports & Exposition Authority v.
93
McCrane:'

[I]f the constitutionally acceptable device of modern day progressive government, i.e., the financially independent authority,
is to succeed in the expeditious accomplishment of public purpose projects, and in persuading investors to buy the authority's
bonds, the good faith covenant of the Legislature for itself and
its successors to refrain from adopting later enactments which
will materially impair the obligation of the authority's bonds
must be 1 94respected. Otherwise the device becomes an empty
formula.

The New York and New Jersey legislatures, in repealing the
1962 covenant, have impaired a constitutionally protected obligation. The practical repercussions of this repudiation-not of a
moral pledge but of a solemn legal pledge-were recently noted in
Moody's Bond Survey:
What does the repeal of a legal obligation, the basis for the Port
Authority's covenants, imply with respect to moral obligations? If
the States are willing to repeal a legal obligation used as the basis
for selling bonds without regard for possible litigation and uncertainty, what chance does a moral obligation have in a period
when sufficient political pressures arise? Or, to phrase another
question: When or under what circumstances would a State legislature find it expedient not to make a contribution to a capital
reserve fund? The answer, if the Port Authority example
pro95
vides one, is when it may be politically expedient.1
The repeal of the covenant, if Moody's is an indication, has
already significantly undermined investor confidence in the trustworthiness of the two states. This erosion can result in higher
interest rates for New Jersey's public authorities and agencies seeking to finance their public projects. Is this a price worth paying
191

Id.

192 See THE NEW JERSEY SPORTS AND ExPOSITION AUTHORITY, OFFICIAL STATEMENT ON

$302,000,000 SPORTS COMPLEX BONDS, 1974 SERIES (1974).
193 61 N.J. 1, 292 A.2d 545, appeal dismissed sub nom. Borough of E. Rutherford v. New
Jersey Sports & Exposition Auth., 409 U.S. 943 (1972).
194 61 N.J. at 29, 292 A.2d at 559. A bill has been introduced to repeal the state's
"moral pledge." N.J. Assembly Bill No. 808 (introduced Jan. 15, 1974).
195 66 MOODY'S BOND SURVEY 772 (1974).
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-- especially when repeal of the covenant does not insure that the
Port Authority will, in fact, be able to undertake any additional
deficit rail operations?1 96 The confidence of the banking and investment community in the two states would be restored by a clear
judicial expression that the repeal of the 1962 covenant violates the
impairment of contracts clause, is not a proper exercise of police
power, and, therefore, is unconstitutional.
Other Developments
Bondholder rights also may be affected by other developments
in New Jersey. In 1969, the New Jersey supreme court upheld the
right of a portion of a municipality to secede and annex itself to
another municipality.' 9 7 Recently, legislation has been introduced
' See Memorandum of the Governor of the State of New York on approving Law of
June 15, 1974, ch. 993, 9 N.Y. SESS. LAw NEws A-363 (1974). After noting that "the Port
Authority is solidly committed to providing mass transportation," Governor Wilson expressed doubt as to the ability of the Authority to undertake further mass transit activities:
In response to my inquiry, the Chairman has also advised me that, because of
the heavy long-term capital commitments for the PATH facilities and the Kennedy
Rail Link, the Authority has no significant capacity to contribute funds for operating subsidies for commuter railroads. Hence, the plain and simple fact of the
matter appears to be that the Authority has virtually no excess funds that could be
channeled into operating subsidies for mass transportation facilities in the New
York metropolitan area. Even if such funds were available, existing bond indenture
provisions which survive despite repeal of the statutory covenant would prohibit
their use except in relation to facilities owned, leased or operated by the Port
Authority.
For these reasons, my approval of the bill should not be considered as a
criticism of the efforts which the Port Authority has made to provide effective
transportation services, including mass transportation services, to the people of the
New York metropolitan area, nor a panacea for the mass transportation problems
plaguing the New York metropolitan area.
Id. at A-362 to -63.
"I West Point Island Civic Ass'n v. Township Comm., 54 N.J. 339, 349-50, 255 A.2d
237, 242 (1969) (construing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:43-26 (1967)). Comprising an area of
"one-half mile square," West Point Island had 1.737 percent of Dover Township's tax
ratables. The island residents wanted to secede from the township and join the Borough of
Lavallette, to which the island was adjacent. The township's business center was seven and a
half miles away from the island and it was necessary to drive through Lavallette to get there.
54 N.J. at 344-45, 255 A.2d at 239. Pursuant to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:43-26 (1967), the
islanders petitioned the governing bodies of the two municipalities to allow the island to
detach itself from Dover Township and become annexed to Lavallette. The Dover Township
Committee refused to consent to the "deannexation." 54 N.J. at 342-43, 255 A.2d at 238-39.
The supreme court overruled the refusal to consent as being without "reasonable grounds,"
finding that the township was not "economically or socially injured by the deannexation, and
the geography is so pointedly in favor of allowing it." Id. at 350, 255 A.2d at 242.
Recently, in-Ryan v. Mayor & Council, 64 N.J. 593, 319 A.2d 442 (1974), the supreme
court again considered a petition for severance. An area consisting of an exclusive residential development sought to withdraw from the Borough of Demarest and attach itself to the
adjacent Borough of Alpine. Part of the development was also located in Alpine. The
Demarest mayor and council refused their consent to the deannexation petition on the
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which would allow part of a school district to withdraw from a
regional system. 9 8 These events may have a significant impact on
the holders of bonds issued by the respective entities.,
A bondholder purchases a bond from a municipality or school
district in reliance on the taxing power and credit-worthiness of the
entity as a whole. When the legislature allows a portion of the
entity to sever itself, the original area's taxing potential is reduced.
In authorizing the secession of part of a school district, the New
Jersey legislature has provided for the apportionment of school
district debt between the new and old districts. 199 If either of the
districts cannot meet its share, does the bondholder have the right
to proceed against the non-defaulting district for payment?
The Florida supreme court faced a similar question in Humphreys v. State ex rel. Palm Beach Co. 2"' Seven years after issuing
ground that the interest and welfare of the municipality would be harmed. Id. at 596-97, 319
A.2d at 444. Although the development constituted only sixteen of the municipality's 1547
homes, it provided 2.11 percent of the total tax ratables, residential and commercial, in the
borough. The development's residents were socially and politically active in the Demarest
community. Id. at 598-99, 319 A.2d at 445. Despite evidence that the borough's tax revenues
would be decreased while its operating expenses in providing public services would remain
the same, the trial court ordered the governing body to consent. It concluded that the social
and economic detriments to the municipality were "insignificant." Id. at 599-600, 319 A.2d at
445-46. The supreme court reversed. Id. at 606, 319 A.2d at 449. The court held that the
borough had met its burden of producing evidence of substantial social or economic injury
to the municipality, and that the burden of proving the unreasonable withholding of consent
had not been satisfied by the plaintiffs. Id. at 602, 319 A.2d at 447. Speaking of the economic
injury that would result from deannexation, Justice Clifford wrote:
[Ilt is certain that the owners of these exclusive and expensive homes contributed
substantially more to the Borough than they cost in services. (What is clearly
inferable from the record . . . is that plaintiffs sought deannexation primarily
because it would save them considerable money, the property tax rate in Alpine
being significantly lower than in Demarest, where they feared an additional burden
because of sewer installation.) The municipal fathers quite properly considered the
amount of both the long term and the short term loss of revenue in determining
that the proposed deannexation would mean economic injury to the Borough.
Id. at 603, 319 A.2d at 448. Justice Pashman, concurring in the result, dissented to the
distribution of burdens of proof. Concluding that any deannexation results in loss of tax
ratables or in disruption of the social character of a municipality, he stated: "It must always
fall, therefore, to the potential seccessionists to prove that in fact the economic or social
consequences of deannexation will be de minimis." Id. at 607, 319 A.2d at 450. Rather than
attempting to show no social or economic harm, "a task in which they can never succeed,"
plaintiffs seeking deannexation should show that the benefits to the seceding area outweighed any harm to the remainder of the municipality. Id.
I N.J. Assembly Bill No. 824 (introduced Jan. 24, 1974) (withdrawal from all-purpose
regional school district); N.J. Assembly Bill No. 825 (introduced Jan. 24, 1974) (withdrawal
from limited purpose regional school district). See also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:8-4 et seq.
(1968) (division of school district on division of municipality).
199 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:8-7 (1968); cf. N.J. Assembly Bill No. 825, § 3 (introduced Jan.
24, 1974).
01 108 Fla. 92, 145 So. 858 (1933).
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bonds, the Town of Boynton was divided by the legislature into the
towns of Boynton and Boynton Beach. The legislature also provided that each of the new towns should assume fifty percent of the
indebtedness of the original town. 0 1 Subsequently, the bonds were
in default, and the bondholders sought to have the towns, jointly
or severally, levy sufficient taxes for payment-without regard to
the fifty percent legislative apportionment. 0 2 The court held that
although the legislature had the power to divide municipal
corporations, 2° 3 it could not "take away taxes necessary to meet the
payments pledged to be made therefrom when the bonds were
sold. ' 20

4

If precluded from this recourse, the bondholders would

be substantially without a remedy.
Holders of New Jersey governmental bonds may face such a
threat from legislation allowing severance. Were the legislature
permitted to release the seceding portions from the entire obligation, the dire consequences are apparent. If the "richer" areas of
school districts or municipalities containing most of the ratables felt
that their tax burden was too great in relation to the amount of
services received, they might seek to have their burden lightened
by severing themselves from the rest of the area. The legislature
has provided that on division of a school district, the new districts
will assume that portion of the entire debt which relates to the
amount of school property within their boundaries. 20 5 This division may create the following situation: One new district may have
fifty percent of the school property and a significantly greater
percentage of the tax ratables, while the other new district, not so
generously endowed with ratables, will nevertheless be responsible
for fifty percent of the debt. In the not unlikely event of a default
by the poorer district, the bondholder must have the right to
201

Id. at 94-98, 145 So. at 859-61.

202 Id. at 94-95, 145 So. at 860.
203
204
205

Id. at 108, 145 So. at 864.
Id. at 103, 145 So. at 862.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:8-7 (1968). This method of apportionment departs from the

formula followed in the predecessor statute which had been based on the ratio of tax
ratables in the new district. Law of April 27, 1931, ch. 270, [1931] N.J. Laws 680. The older
method was examined in Board of Educ. v. Board of Educ., 8 N.J. Super. 124, 73 A.2d 600
(App. Div. 1950). The court noted that the statute made "more equitable the distribution of
liabilities on the bonded indebtedness" than a division determined by the location of school
property. Id. at 129, 73 A.2d at 602.
The proposed bills in the Assembly follow the approach of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:8-7
(1968). See N.J. Assembly Bill No. 824, § I (introduced Jan. 24, 1974); N.J. Assembly Bill
No. 825, § 3 (introduced Jan. 24, 1974). Is it not more equitable to take into consideration
the ability to pay, i.e., the tax ratables, as well as the amount of school property situated in
each district?
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proceed against the richer district, otherwise he will have lost a
substantial remedy inherent in his original contract.2 °6 While the
legislature can sever an area and apportion primary responsibility
for the debt, this apportionment must imply secondary liability for
the entire debt. Since the bondholder relied on the taxing power of
the entire school district or municipality, the impairment of contracts clause requires that the legislature not release either area
from ultimate responsibility for repayment of the original debt.
CONCLUSION

The foregoing analysis demonstrates that some legislative acts
which appear to violate the impairment of contract clause, in fact,
do not do so. The courts can construe such actions as leaving intact
the original undertaking of the contracting parties. This category
includes revamping the method of financing public education and
rearranging the boundaries of municipalities, school districts, and
other taxing districts. A second category of cases involves legislative
modifications of existing contractual rights which the courts determined had not constituted the central undertaking of one party
nor the primary consideration of the other party to the contract.
This group is exemplified by the El Paso case where the Supreme
Court permitted modifications of contractual rights in a manner
"hardly burdensome" to the party whose rights were affected. It
should be noted, however, that the contractual rights of the
holders of bonds issued by governmental units rarely, if ever, fall
into this category. For example, in the Sills case, the revenue loss
resulting from the legislative act permitting reservists and
guardsmen to use the Garden State Parkway toll-free was de
minimis. Yet, the New Jersey supreme court refused to permit this
legislative modification of bondholders' rights. When the legislature responds to the Robinson v. Cahill mandate, its actions will be
judged by these principles.
The final category of impairment cases presents the question
whether an act of a state legislature which impairs important, even
essential, contract rights should be upheld as a valid exercise of the
state's reserved police power. Such a result sustaining the police
power requires a showing of grave physical or economic crisis
which threatens the public welfare. This is the only argument
which might validate the repeal of the 1962 covenant in the face of
206 See Humphreys v. State ex rel. Palm Beach Co., 108 Fla. at 102-03, 145 So. at 862.

1974]

MUNICIPAL BONDHOLDERS' RIGHTS

overwhelming evidence that the existence of the covenant was of
primary concern to the bondholders. The Supreme Court in
Worthen has indicated that the courts are loathe to accept
modifications of bondholders' rights, even if an economic crisis
exists. In fact, legislative impairment of bondholders' rights because of the economic crisis has been permitted only when any
other result would lead to total fiscal collapse of the bond issuer
and the impossibility of payment of the bonds. Such is not the case
of the Port Authority. Any emergency which may exist in the field
of mass transit is not caused by the covenant, might or might not
be alleviated by its repeal, and certainly may be solved by other,
constitutionally inoffensive methods.
The fiscal impact of the repeal on the states is a reality. If the
two states wish to restore credibility to their legal and moral commitments and thus maintain borrowing costs at a minimum, they
should abandon their ever more frequent attempts to renege on
these covenants and pledges after substantial sums have been invested in reliance on them. In the meantime, it appears that investors will have to rely on the courts to require the states to live up to
their bargains.

